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I. INTRODUCTION
Societal norms and expectations with regard to pollution control
and conservation of resources have evolved rapidly over the last four
decades. Practices with respect to disposition of wastes, consumption
of energy, and use of land and raw materials that were commonplace
just a few years ago would be unthinkable today. Indeed, now more
than ever, environmentalism has become part of our American
popular culture. 1 These drastic changes in societal norms and
expectations have, not surprisingly, driven substantial changes in law.
The last forty years have seen radical changes to environmental
2
law in the United States. Prior to the dawn of modern environmental

* Carol Dinkins serves as the leader of Vinson & Elkins' environmental
practice group and has extensive environmental litigation experience, including
serving as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Environment and Natural
Resources Division of the Department of Justice from 1981-1983, then Deputy
Attorney General of the United States from 1984 to 1985. George Wilkinson is a
partner in the Firm's environmental practice. Maggie Peloso and Tom Meriwether
are associates in the Firm's environmental practice.
1. Companies of all sorts, from breweries to hotel chains, strive to capitalize
on Americans' growing environmentalism by branding themselves as "green." See
Betsy McKay & Suzanne Vranica, Firms Use Earth Day to Show Their Green
Side: Eco-FriendlyMessages Fill the Air, but are They Being Heard in the Din?,
WALL
ST.
J.,
Apr.
22,
2008,
at
B7,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120882594222933291.html.
2. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,

SCIENCE, AND POLICY 1-2 (5th ed. 2006) ("Since the late 1960s . . . U.S.

environmental law has grown from a sparse set of common law precedents and
local ordinances to encompass a vast body of national legislation.").

123

124

FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAWREVIEW

[VOL. XXI

regulation in the late 1960s, the common law-under doctrines such
as nuisance and trespass-and a few limited local pollution control
and land use ordinances provided the only legal limits on how
industry could impact the environment. 3 Four decades later, things
have changed dramatically. Today, industry faces a massive and
complex web of federal, state, and local environmental statutes,
ordinances, and regulations.4
Corporations have adapted and continue to adapt, usually
reactively, to new legal and societal realities. When the law says they
must, corporations change their practices to comply with new
minimum legal requirements. Sometimes, however, corporations are
more proactive.
Sometimes corporations go beyond merely
complying with the minimum environmental standards required by
the law. Commentators have referred to this practice or concept of
doing more to protect or preserve the environment than simply
meeting the baseline mandated by applicable law as environmental
"corporate social responsibility" ("CSR").

3. See id. at 1-2, 62-84.
4. Since 1970, the United States Congress has enacted numerous major
environmental statutes including, but not limited to, the National Environmental
Policy Act; the Clean Air Act; the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean
Water Act); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; the Marine
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (Ocean Dumping Act); the Endangered
Species Act; the Safe Drinking Water Act; the Toxic Substances Control Act; the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act; the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; and the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act. Id. at 91-92. Each of these federal statutory
programs has its own set of implementing regulations, and many have
corresponding or similar state laws and regulations.
5. CSR has been defined in a number of ways. Indeed, as one commentator
has explained, there is no single "commonly accepted definition" and, thus, "the
term is still largely ambiguous." Janet E. Kerr, The Creative CapitalismSpectrum:
Evaluating Corporate Social Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. L.
REV. 831, 848-49 (2008). Kerr asserts that CSR should be defined broadly as "a
company's policies and programs that consider both the financial and social
impacts of decisions." Id. at 834. Kerr agrees with us, however, that only when a
company "chooses to go beyond merely operating within the law" can it "truthfully
claim to be socially responsible." Id. at 857; see also Paul R. Portney, Corporate
Social Responsibility: An Economic and Public Policy Perspective, in
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS:
PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW, ECONOMICS, AND BusINEss 107, 108 (Bruce L. Hay et

al. eds., 2005) (defining CSR as "a consistent pattern, at the very least, of private
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Companies that engage in CSR most often assert two arguments as
justifications for doing more than legally required. 6 First, corporate
decision makers often contend that they have a moral obligation to go
beyond what the law requires. Bill Gates, for example, has asserted
that companies have a moral obligation not to focus solely on making
a profit, but also to "improv[e] [the] lives of those who don't fully
benefit from today's market forces."8 Second, companies often
profess that non-regulatory market forces motivate implementation of
CSR initiatives.9 For example, companies engaging in environmental
CSR may reason that consumers will be more loyal and pay more for
so-called "green" products, thus making the entity more profitable
and increasing shareholder value; that they will be better able to hire
and retain highly skilled employees; and/or that they will be able to
obtain capital at lower costs.' 0
firms doing more than they are required to do under applicable laws and regulations
governing the environment, worker safety and health, and investments in the
communities in which they operate").
6. See Portney, supra note 5, at 112 (asserting that proponents of CSR offer
two primary justifications: (1) "moral obligation," and (2) non-regulatory market
forces, such that "perhaps a great deal of environmental protection ... would be
forthcoming even in the absence of regulation"); Forest L. Reinhardt,
Environmental Protection and the Social Responsibility of Firms: Perspectives
from the Business Literature, in ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY OF FIRMS: PERSPECTIVES FROM LAW ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS

151, 151 (Bruce L. Hay, et al. eds., 2005) (explaining that company decision
makers most often justify environmental CSR by asserting that "such investments
enhance shareholder value ('it pays to be green')," and by invoking "ethical
arguments").
7. See Reinhardt, supra note 6; see also JunJie Wu, Environmental
Compliance: The Good, the Bad, and the Super Green, 90 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 3363,
3371 (2009) (concluding, through an empirical survey, that "personal
environmental values and beliefs [of upper management individuals] are the most
significant factors affecting overcompliance").
8. Bill Gates, Chairman, Microsoft Corp., Remarks at the World Economic
Forum 2008: A New Approach to Capitalism in the 21st Century (Jan. 24, 2008)
(transcript
available
at
http://www.microsoft.com/Presspass/exec/billg/speeches/2008/0124WEFDavos.mspx).
9. See Portney, supra note 5, at 112; Reinhardt, supra note 6, at 151.
10. Portney, supra note 5, at 113; see also Kerr, supra note 5, at 850 (reporting
the results of a survey in which consumers "identified 'being socially responsible'
as the factor most likely to influence 'brand loyalty' (citing GOLDMAN SACHS,
INTRODUCING
GS
SUSTAIN
22
(2007),
available
at
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While moral obligation and non-regulatory market forces may
indeed drive environmental CSR, a look at recent history strongly
suggests that another force is at work-a force that companies may
not openly acknowledge. That force is environmental litigation."
This Article asserts that public and private litigants, through both
criminal and civil litigation, have pushed business entities to engage
in environmental CSR. In support of this thesis, the Article analyzes
several discrete examples from the last few decades and shows how
certain types of litigation have motivated companies to go beyond
mere compliance into the realm of environmental CSR. Furthermore,
the Article concludes that litigation will continue to be an important
driver for environmental CSR for the foreseeable future, ultimately
resulting in reduced pollution and more sustainable practices.
Part II considers how "Superfund" litigation under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA") encouraged companies to minimize waste
generation to avoid potential future liability rather than merely
dispose of waste streams in conformance with current law. Part III
describes how a dramatic increase, beginning in the 1980s, in
criminal prosecutions of individual corporate officials for alleged
violations of environmental laws encouraged corporate decision
makers to reevaluate routine practices and implement proactive
programs that go beyond compliance. Part III also explores how the
United States Sentencing Guidelines and agency guidance on the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion encouraged companies to
implement new programs-beyond anything required by any
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/summit2007/gsesgembargoeduntilO3070
7pdf.pdf)). Other reasons given by companies for over-compliance include (1)
obtaining favorable treatment from regulators, such as less time required for
permitting, or less stringent enforcement; (2) preempting more stringent regulation;
and (3) encouraging more stringent regulation to impose higher costs on
competitors. See Portney, supra note 5, at 113; Wu, supra note 7, at 3364;
Christopher S. Decker & Christopher R. Pope, Adherence to Environmental Law:
The Strategic Complementarities of Compliance Decisions, 45 Q. REv. ECON. &
FIN. 641, 642-43 (2005).
11. For example, one empirical study showed that enforcement-which often
involves litigation-"can significantly increase the degree of statutory overcompliance with environmental regulations. . . ." Jay P. Shimshack & Michael B.
Ward, Enforcement and Over-Compliance, 55 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 90, 90
(2008). We argue that more than just enforcement litigation pushes companies to
over-comply with applicable environmental regulations.
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applicable regulatory scheme-for detecting, reporting, and
correcting environmental violations. Part IV evaluates how citizen
suits have driven environmental CSR through the implementation of
creative settlement agreements that require companies to make
changes that do more than simply bring them into compliance with
applicable law. Lastly, Part V looks at other environmental suits
initiated by private parties, including challenges to agency permitting
actions and tort suits, and shows how these types of litigation have
encouraged environmental CSR by establishing new models for
environmental protection and serving as reliable indicators of
evolving societal expectations. The Article concludes by predicting
that litigation will continue to push companies to do more than the
law requires to protect the environment.
II. SUPERFUND LITIGATION

Litigation associated with the evolution of laws controlling waste
disposal has been a significant driver of corporate behavior change
over the past quarter century. Most importantly, an explosion in
Superfund litigation and the huge potential liabilities associated with
it caused many companies to change their waste disposal practices
beyond legal requirements. 12 Faced with the potential of civil
judgments in the tens to hundreds of millions of dollars and strict,
retroactive application of new standards for liability, many
corporations developed new methods for the minimizing, handling,
treatment, and disposal of hazardous wastes. This section briefly
describes the evolution of waste regulation under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") and CERCLA and how
the liabilities imposed under these Acts shaped corporate waste
disposal practices beyond the requirements of the law.
Through the 1960s and 70s land disposal was the primary means of
handling wastes. Even after the passage of RCRA in 1976, land
disposal remained common. In fact, a 1983 report by the Office of
Technology Assessment found that "[1]and disposal is used for as

12. See JAN PAUL ACTON, UNDERSTANDING SUPERFUND 19 (1989) (finding that
CERCLA's strict, retroactive liability for past waste handling practices "should
lead to more conservative waste-handling practices both today and in the future and
may lead business to reduce its use of toxic materials.").

128

FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[[VOL. X XI

much as 80 percent of regulated hazardous wastes."l 3 As initially
enacted, RCRA granted broad regulatory authority to the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), which it was reluctant to
exercise. 14 Due to growing concerns about the increasing hazardous
waste problem, Congress substantially amended RCRA in 1984
through the passage of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments
("HSWA").'" The most significant portions of these amendments
limited the scope of EPA's discretion,16 imposed waste minimization
requirements,1 7 and imposed a "land ban" on the disposal of
hazardous waste.' 8
While RCRA established a comprehensive regulatory system to
deal with hazardous wastes currently being generated by corporate
activities, it did nothing about the large quantities of hazardous
wastes that were already in the environment and threatening human
health.19 Because corporations that modified their waste disposal
practices to comply with RCRA's requirements faced little threat of
litigation, RCRA was not on its own a significant litigation-based
driver of CSR.
In contrast, because of its retroactive, strict, joint and several,
liability, CERCLA has been a significant driver of changes in
13. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TECHNOLOGIES AND MANAGEMENT
The Office of
STRATEGIES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE CONTROL 3 (1983).

Technology Assessment was an office of Congress created in 1972 to provide
members of Congress with objective analysis of complex science and technological
issues. The Office was closed in 1995.
14. See Erik H. Corwin, Note, CongressionalLimits on Agency Discretion:A
Case Study of the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, 29 HARV. J.
LEGIS. 517, 533-34 (1992).
15. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, §§
101, 201-202.
16. Corwin, supranote 14, at 534.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 6922(b) (2009). RCRA creates a "cradle to grave" system of
waste regulation. Part of this system requires that all hazardous waste generators
produce a manifest to track all hazardous wastes from the time of generation until
disposal. Id. § 6922(a)(5). The HSWA imposed the additional requirements that all
manifests contain a certification stating (1) that the generator had a plan in place to
reduce the volume, quantity or toxicity of the waste and (2) the proposed method of
currently available treatment minimizes the present and future harm to human
health. Id. § 6922(b).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 6294(c)-(d) (2009) (prohibiting the disposal of liquid hazardous
wastes in landfills).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 6922.
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corporate waste disposal practices. After seeing the litigation arising
from historical disposal practices that frequently met industry or
societal standards at the time and the consequences of CERCLA
liability, many companies began to put substantial efforts into
evaluating the practices used at potential disposal sites as well as the
companies who operate those sites. 20 This added scrutiny by
hazardous waste generators has improved waste management
practices, reduced the volume of hazardous waste generated, and
reduced the potential for release of hazardous substances from
disposal sites. 2 1
Congress passed CERCLA in 1980 to ensure the clean up of
abandoned hazardous waste sites that pose a threat to human health
22
and the environment.
CERCLA's statutory design is intended to
ensure that hazardous waste sites are promptly cleaned up and that
the government is reimbursed for any costs incurred in cleaning up
hazardous waste sites.2 3 CERCLA provides the EPA with two
mechanisms by which it may clean up a site. First, the EPA can
conduct site cleanup on its own and then seek to recover costs of the
cleanup from any potentially responsible party ("PRP"), 24 which the
act broadly defines to include nearly every person in the chain of
waste generation and disposal. 25 Second, the EPA may order a PRP
to clean up the site, 26 who may in turn seek contribution from other
PRPs.27 CERCLA also allows a private party to voluntarily clean up
a site and seek contribution from PRPs.2 8
20. See ACTON, supra note 12, at 19.
21. See John C. Buckley, Reducing the EnvironmentalImpact of CERCLA, 41
S.C. L. REv. 765, 789-93 (1990).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (2009); Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, § 101; see also
President James Carter, Remarks on Signing Public Law 96-510, 16 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 2797, 2798 (Dec. 11, 1980).
23. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 263-64 (3d Cir.
1992); see also Acushnet Co. v. Mohasco Co., 191 F.3d 69, 77 (1st Cir. 1999).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (2009).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2009). PRPs include the following persons: (1)
current owners or operators of facilities; (2) owners or operators of facilities at the
time of disposal; (3) anyone who "arranged for" disposal or treatment of hazardous
wastes; and (4) anyone who transported hazardous wastes. Id.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9606. (2009)
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607; 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (2009).
28. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(B), 9613(f)(1).
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PRPs are liable for, among other things, all costs of environmental
remediation incurred by EPA or the state government as well as any
other necessary response costs incurred by any other person. 29
Liability under CERCLA is strict-meaning that all the EPA must
demonstrate is that a PRP sent wastes to or owned a site that is now
contaminated.
In fact, as long as the government can demonstrate
that a PRP contributed a "waste" to the site, it does not even have to
demonstrate that the particular waste sent by the PRP is the source of
the current threat before imposing liability. 3 1 Furthermore, although
not required, CERCLA permits the imposition of joint and several
liability on PRPs.32 Joint and several liability can result in a party
paying to remediate more harm than it actually caused, and if the
other contributors to the site are insolvent or protected by consent
decree settlements, the PRP will not be able to recover the amounts it
has paid that exceed the harm it actually caused.3 3 Consequently,
CERCLA liability raises the possibility that even relatively small
contributors will face large financial liabilities in the event that a
contaminated site needs to be cleaned up. 34
Even in the early days of CERLCA cleanups, corporations quickly
became aware that proper waste disposal at the time of generation
was significantly less expensive than CERCLA liability to clean up
29. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
30. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 263-64 (3d Cir.
1992); see also Acushnet Co. v. Mohasco Co., 191 F.3d 69, 77 (1st Cir. 1999).
31. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir.
1993).
32. The leading case establishing this principle is United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2); United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d
79, 92 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that CERCLA grants a measure of finality to those
PRPs willing to settle with the government by protecting them from subsequent
contribution claims); United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258 (D.
Del. 1986) (finding that protecting settlings parties from future litigation is an
important part of the process); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 628 F.
Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (same); see also United States v. Kramer, 953 F. Supp.
592, 594 (D.N.J. 1997) (finding that equitable allocation of orphan shares is
permissible); Charter Township v. Am. Cyanamid, 898 F. Supp. 506 (W.D. Mich.
1995) (finding that orphan shares should be equitably apportioned to all parties in a
CERCLA contribution action).
34. Note that the current trend in CERCLA litigation appears to be towards
assessing the divisibility of harms, even at sites where wastes are mixed. See
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1870 (2009).
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improperly disposed wastes. For example, in 1983 the Office of
Technology Assessment found that the proper disposal of all of the
wastes at Love Canal would have cost approximately $2 million at
the time of generation rather than the projected $100 million in clean
up costs. 35 At the time that the initial disposals at Love Canal
occurred, they were within the bounds of what was legally and
societally permissible. However, because of changing legal regimes
and societal expectations, the ultimate costs of these disposal
practices was more than an order of magnitude greater than what
over-compliance (meeting not-yet enacted RCRA standards) would
have cost. 36
Moreover, even if PRPs are ultimately able to escape the
imposition of strict liability, costs associated with lawsuits to recover
costs or seek contributions from other PRPs can be significant.3 7 In
order to limit initial assessment of financial liability and the need to
pursue subsequent contribution actions,3 8 PRPs have significant
incentives to join as many other PRPs as possible to the initial cost
recovery action. Consequently, CERCLA claims often become
complex, multi-party litigations that continue for years. 39 Such
litigation is both time consuming and expensive, 40 and furthers
CERCLA's efficacy as a driver of environmental CSR.
Because land disposal of hazardous materials in ponds or pits had
been standard practice until the mid 1980s, many corporations were
faced with potentially significant financial liabilities under CERCLA
for their past disposal practices. As CERCLA litigation increased
35. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 13, at 6.

36. See id
37. For the provisions enabling cost recovery and contribution actions by

private parties see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9613.
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (giving PRPs the right to seek financial
contributions from other PRPs).
39. See, e.g., United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp., 453 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir.
2006).
40. See Superfund: Litigation Costs of Liability Scheme Prevent, Delay
Cleanups, Speakers Say, [1991] Envt. Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 15, 1991) (finding that
nearly 20% of Superfund costs are transaction costs associated with litigation and
enforcement); Superfund: Cleanup Fund Wasted on Transaction Costs, CERCLA
Needs Complete Overhaul, ABA Panel Says, [1990] Envt. Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 10,
1990) (stating that EPA estimates that $14.6 billion would be spent on the cleanup
of 1,800 NPL sites and that an additional $8 billion in litigation costs will be
incurred by the government and private litigants).
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and the costs of clean up became apparent, companies became more
aware of the need to ensure that their current waste handling practices
not only complied with RCRA regulations, but went further to ensure
that disposal would stand the test of time, avoiding potential
CERCLA liability and minimizing exposure to future evolution of
standards and the law. 41
III. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
Criminal enforcement is a potentially important source of CSR
because of the associated deterrent effect. That is, when the
government initiates criminal proceedings against a corporation,
other corporations are likely to evaluate and change their own
behavior in order to avoid similar prosecutions in the future. This
effect should be particularly significant because of the negative
spillover effects of criminal prosecution, including social stigma,
denial of access to federal contracts and assistance, and the potential
for related civil litigation. 42 This section considers the impact that
enforcement through direct criminal prosecution, as well as
government enforcement policies and sentencing guidelines, have on
environmental CSR.
A.

CriminalEnforcement

Criminal sanctions in environmental statutes date back to the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, but were not widespread until the
1970s.4 3 Even after criminal provisions were widely enacted,
enforcement throughout the 1970s was limited, with only twenty-five
criminal environmental prosecutions at the federal level for the whole
41. See Buckley, supra note 21, at 789-90; see also Andrew J. Hoffman, The
Hazardous Waste Remediation Market: Innovative Technological Development
and the Growing Involvement of the Construction Industry 4-5 (Aug. 15, 1991)
(unpublished M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with
authors) ("Superfund has served to change the behavior of almost every sector of
society, making all aware of the effects and penalties (both environmental and
financial) of careless disregard for our environment.").
42. Carol E. Dinkins, Collateral Consequences of Conviction, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY 318, 318 (Donald A. Carr et al. eds., 1995).
43. See Carol E. Dinkins, CriminalEnforcement ofEnvironmental Regulations:
The Genesis of Environmental Enforcement Through Criminal Sanctions, in
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY 1, 3-4 (Donald A. Carr et al., eds., 1995).
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decade.4 Criminal environmental litigation in the United States has
increased dramatically since the 1980s.45 This increase in criminal
prosecution and more vigorous government enforcement policies
have prompted many companies to implement environmental
management programs that go well beyond the minimum that is
required to comply with the law.4 6 Furthermore, empirical research
suggests that increasing enforcement activities increases pollution
reduction activities even from those companies that are already in
compliance with environmental standards.4 7
Prior to 1982, criminal prosecutions for violations of
environmental laws were rare.4 8 In the early 1980s, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice ("DOJ"), and EPA
launched a joint effort to vigorously investigate and prosecute
environmental crimes. 49 Part of this effort included the establishment
of the environmental crimes unit within DOJ in 1981.50 At the same
time, EPA established its own Office of Criminal Enforcement and
hired professional criminal investigators.5 1 Between 1982 and 1986,
DOJ's environmental crimes unit was so successful that it was
elevated to become the Environmental Crimes Section in 1985.52
The resources for environmental prosecutions were further increased
by the Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, which authorized the
appointment of a new director of the Office of Criminal
Investigations within EPA and mandated that the office hire 200 new
criminal investigators by 1996.53

44. Id. at 5.
45. See Roger G. Marzulla & Brett G. Kappel, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to
Hide: Criminal Liabilityfor Violations of Environmental Statutes in the 1990s, 16
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 201, 202 (1991).
46. See Allison F. Gardner, Beyond Compliance: Regulatory Incentives to
Implement Environmental Management Systems, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 662, 667
(2003) (finding that continued, rigorous enforcement, including criminal penalties,
is necessary to encourage the adoption of and adherence to environmental
management systems that go beyond compliance).
47. Shimshack & Ward, supranote 11, at 91.
48. See Marzulla & Kappel, supranote 45, at 204-08.
49. Id. at 206.
50. Dinkins, supranote 43, at 7.
51. Id.; Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 50, at 207.
52. Dinkins, supranote 43, at 9.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 13103 (2009).
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Because of this large increase in resources, criminal enforcement
under the United States' environmental laws has increased
dramatically. As recently as 1985, 40 defendants were charged with
environmental crimes, and total sentences obtained for these crimes
were 78 months.5 4 By 2001, 372 defendants were charged with
environmental crimes, and they received total sentences of 256 years
and $95 million in fines.5 5 The dramatic increase in financial
penalties and sentences in both criminal and civil cases since the
1980s is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 below.
Figure 1: Trends in Enforcement PenaltieS56
History of EPA Enforcement Penalties Assessed
$250
Civi Penalties
AdministrativePenalties
Crimiinal Penalties
$200

o
$150

$100

$50

Year

54. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT: FY 1997, at 94 (1998).
55. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
PROGRAM, NUMBERS AT A GLANCE FISCAL YEARS 2002-1998 (2003).

56. Source data is drawn from Environmental Protection Agency, National
Enforcement
Trends,
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/data/results/nets.html#numbers (last visited Sept.
12, 2010).
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Figure 2: Trends in Criminal Sentences in Environmental
Cases57
Environmetnal Criminal Sentences
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This dramatic increase in enforcement activity shaped evolution of
corporations' proactive prevention of criminal exposure for
environmental harms. It was not only the sheer volume of cases
pursued but also the types of prosecutions that influenced corporate
decision making with respect to criminal environmental exposure.
That is, in addition to high profile cases, there were many cases
where the alleged criminal conduct looked very much like the
ordinary course of business for many corporations. This proliferation
of prosecutions for seemingly routine events prompted companies
and their environmental managers to view prosecution as a real risk
even when engaged in routine job functions.
An example of one of such a prosecution is the 1999 criminal
prosecution of Michael Peters and Jeffery Jackson of Huntsman
57. Source data is drawn from ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
NATIONAL ENFORCEMENT TRENDS FY2004 - FY 2008 CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM ACTIVITIES at C-4 (2009) (data from 2004-2009); ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAM NUMBERS AT A
GLANCE FISCAL YEARS 2002-1998 (data from 1998 to 2002); ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE
ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 1999 at B-5 (2000) (data from 1984 to 1999).
58. See infra notes 59-72 and accompanying text.
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Chemical Corporation for violations of the Clean Air Act. The
Huntsman Chemical Corporation owns and operates a plant in Port
Arthur, Texas that produces a number of aromatics and olefins
including ethylene, propylene, and cyclohexalene. 59 The case against
Jackson and Peters involved alleged releases of benzene from the
plant's cooling tower and an improperly sealed storage tank. 60 At the
time of the alleged releases, Peters was the environmental manager of
the plant and Jackson was the plant manager.61
Huntsman discovered that benzene was leaking into the plant's
cooling tower and Peters drafted a letter to state regulators indicating
that the benzene release was a "major upset" (an unusual event where
emissions are much higher than they would be during normal
operations). 62 Several weeks later, Peters drafted and Jackson signed
a notice of continuous release for the same benzene emissions that
was sent to both the EPA and state regulators.6 3 The government
alleged that this second notice improperly contradicted the earlier
letter.64 Further, the government alleged that Peters' letter used
benzene emission samples from a different location to give a lower,
false representation of actual emissions. 6 5
With regard to the benzene storage tank, the government alleged
that Jackson and Peters knowingly failed to disclose that the level in
the tank was low, and thus the floating roof of the tank was not in
contact with the liquid in the tank, when the tank was struck by
lightening in November of 1995.66 Moreover, the government
charged Jackson and Peters for a violation of the Clean Air Act for
the unauthorized emissions from the tank that resulted from the roof
not remaining in contact with the liquid in the tank.67
59. United States v. Peters, 349 F.3d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 2003).
60. Peters, 349 F.3d at 844. Because benzene is a potentially toxic chemical, its
releases must be managed in accordance with standards promulgated under the
National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants ("NESHAP"). 42
U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2009). Under the NESHAPs, the EPA has promulgated specific
regulations for the storage and transfer of benzene in industrial processes. See 40
C.F.R. §§ 61.270-61.306 (2010).
61. Peters, 349 F.3d at 844
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. United States v. Peters, 349 F.3d 842, 844 (5th Cir. 2003).
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Upon discovering these violations, the EPA referred the case to the
Department of Justice to pursue criminal enforcement against Peters
and Jackson as responsible officials. A federal grand jury indicted
them for attempting to prevent the United States from discovering the
unauthorized release of a volatile organic compound and operating
the benzene storage tank in violation of the Clean Air Act.68 The
case proceeded to jury trial in the Eastern District of Texas. Peters
and Jackson were found guilty of knowingly operating a defective
tank in violation of the Clean Air Act, making a false writing to the
EPA, and conspiracy to make a false writing.69
The conviction was overturned by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals due to an ex parte meeting between the judge and the
foreperson of the jury during deliberations.7 0 While the case was
awaiting retrial on remand, Peters and Jackson reached an agreement
with the government under which they would plead guilty to certain
charges. On May 24, 2004, the District Court accepted their pleas
and sentenced each man to six months of home confinement, five
years of probation, and a civil fine of $20,000.
The Peters/Jackson case highlights the concerns that corporate
officials may have regarding the potential for criminal enforcement
for environmental violations. Although Peters and Jackson argued
that they acted in good faith and attempted to comply with the law,
both were ultimately found guilty. This case reinforced a broad
perception in the corporate community that an ordinary plant or
environmental manager may be criminally liable for actions taken in

68. Id. at 846.

69. Id. at 844. Federal regulations require that benzene storage vessels be
equipped with a fixed, sealed roof or an internal floating roof to prevent air
emissions of benzene through evaporation. 40 C.F.R. § 61.271. For vessels with
floating roofs, the roof must be in contact with the liquid's surface at all times. Id.
The jury found that Huntsman did not comply with these regulations and the
process by which they reported upset emissions amounted to making a false
writing.
70. Peters,349 F.3d at 849-50.
71. Press Release, Office of the United States Attorney for the Eastern District
of Texas, Former Huntsman Plant Managers Guilty, Personally Responsible for
Polluting
Environment
(May
26,
2004),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/txe/newsrelease/news/huntsmanbattecarraway.pdf.
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the ordinary course of business. 72 In turn, this perception has driven
environmental CSR initiatives.
B. The Role of Sentencing Guidelines andProsecutorial
Discretion

As described above, the dramatic increase in criminal
environmental enforcement coupled with the prosecution of
seemingly routine practices that led to statutory violations should
drive changes in corporate environmental behavior. Namely, the
threat of severe criminal sanctions, and the reputation damage that
accompanies them should lead companies to be more cautious in their
environmental compliance. For companies that are risk averse, we
would expect that they would not ensure only minimal compliance,
but rather would go beyond what is required to reduce the likelihood
of criminal prosecution. This is precisely what we see in the
adoption of corporate environmental programs, which while not
statutorily required, are likely to come into consideration when
prosecutors decide whether to press charges and would certainly be
considered under sentencing guidelines.
The United States Sentencing Guidelines, while no longer
mandatory, 73 provide an important basis from which courts begin
when determining criminal penalties to be imposed upon a guilty
party.74 The Guidelines prescribe factors for courts to apply when
72. Another important lesson from this case is that the pollution statutes are
strict with respect to the emissions and operations standards. That is, any
exceedance of a stated emission limitation can potentially give rise to liability.
Furthermore, most criminal sections of the major environmental laws require only
that the defendant knows of the actions leading to the pollution event. See, e.g. 33
U.S.C. § 1319(c) (2010); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (2009); 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2009);
see also Kevin A. Gaynor, Jodi C. Remer, & Thomas R. Bartman, Environmental
CriminalProsecutions:Simple Fixesfor a FlawedSystem, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4
(1992) (arguing that the mens rea for environmental crimes should be elevated).
Consequently, as in the Peters/Jackson case, it is possible that knowledge of the
actions of subordinates on the part of senior corporate officials may result in
criminal liability.
73. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005) (holding that
mandatory sentencing guidelines that do not allow judges to consider additional
circumstances violate the Sixth Amendment).
74. See id at 259 (explaining that although the Sentencing Guidelines are not
mandatory, judges must still "take account of the Guidelines together with other
sentencing goals").
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assessing the severity of criminal harms for sentencing. The
compliance factors from the Sentencing Guidelines are frequently
used as important guidance for corporate entities who wish to reduce
their exposure to potential liabilities. Published in 1991, the section
of the Sentencing Guidelines that addresses organizational liability
provides factors that will be used to determine a corporation's
liability for the purposes of both issuing fines and determining
organizational probation.76 Because of concerns about the complex
and unique nature of environmental crimes, the Sentencing
Commission decided to exclude environmental crimes from the
corporate section of the Guidelines.7 7 In 1993, the Sentencing
Commission proposed an additional chapter to cover corporate
environmental crimes that was never enacted.
However, both the
corporate Sentencing Guidelines and the proposed guidelines for
corporate environmental harms have been significant drivers of the
adoption of environmental compliance programs and CSR. 79
The Guidelines "offer incentives to organizations to reduce and
ultimately eliminate criminal conduct by providing a structural
foundation from which an organization may self-police its own
conduct through an effective compliance and ethics program."8 0
According to the Guidelines, the two most important factors in
mitigating the punishment of an organization are (1) the existence of
an effective compliance and ethics program and (2) self-reporting of
violations, cooperation with authorities, and acceptance of
responsibility.8 1
With respect to corporate compliance programs, the Guidelines
provide a detailed description of what is required to minimize
organizational liability. 82 The two most important features of an
effective corporate compliance program are the exercise of due
diligence to prevent criminal behavior and promotion of "an
§ 8B2.1(a) (2009).
76. Id.
77. Dinkins, supranote 43, at 14.
78. Id; Carol E. Dinkins & Sean A. Lonnquist, The Belt and Suspenders
Approach: The Advantages of a FormalizedEnvironmental Compliance Program,
UTAH L. REv. 1129, 1142 (2009).
75. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'M, GUIDELINES MANUAL

79. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'M, GUIDELINES MANUAL intro. cmt.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id § 8B2.1.
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organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and
commitment to compliance with the law." 83 The Guidelines go on to
list a number of specific factors for which courts will look in
determining whether the corporation has an effective compliance and
ethics program. First, the organization must establish standards to
prevent and detect criminal conduct. 84 Both the corporation's
governing body and all high level personnel within the organization
are responsible for knowing the contents of the program and ensuring
adherence to it.85 To ensure adequate knowledge of the corporation's
compliance program, periodic training of high level officials
regarding the standards and procedures of the compliance program is
required.86 The organization must also conduct appropriate training
and monitoring to make sure that the program is followed at all
levels. 87 If these monitoring efforts lead to the detection of criminal
conduct, the organization must take reasonable steps to respond,
including making necessary modifications to the compliance
program.88

If an organization meets all of these standards and is found to have
an effective compliance program, the existence of the compliance
program will reduce the organization's culpability score, used for
determining the ultimate penalty. 89 Such reductions in potential
culpability may be particularly significant in the environmental
context because the Guidelines state that criminal offenses presenting
a threat to the environment may justify an upward departure from the
sentence recommended by the Guidelines. 9 0 Furthermore, the
Guidelines provide substantial incentives for organizations to adopt
compliance programs proactively. The Guidelines counsel that
upward departure from the suggested penalties is warranted to offset
a reduction in an entity's culpability score due to the existence of an
effective compliance program when that program was initiated in
response to a court order or an administrative order. 9 1 Consequently,
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. § 8B2.1(a).
Id. § 8B2.1(b)(1).
Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2).
Id. 8B2.1(b)(4).
Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5).
Id. § 8B2.1(b)(7).
Id. § 8BC2.5(f).
Id. § 8C4.4.
Id. § 8C4.10.
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the standards in the Guidelines have driven the development of
corporate environmental compliance programs that are proactive in
nature and seek to prevent criminal violations. 92
Similarly, the proposed guidelines for corporate environmental
crimes emphasize the importance of proactive compliance programs
and management involvement in compliance. 93 Going beyond the
corporate sentencing guidelines, the proposed environmental crimes
guidelines would actually penalize a corporation for failing to have a
compliance program. 94 If an organization did not have a compliance
program in place prior to the environmental offense, the guidelines
direct that the culpability of the offense should be increased by four
levels.9 5 In order to avoid this culpability increase, an organization
"must document the existence of some form of program or other
organized effort to achieve and maintain compliance." 96
On the other hand, an organization's commitment to environmental
compliance, as demonstrated by the commitment of sufficient
resources and management processes to maintain compliance, can be
a mitigating factor at the time of sentencing. 97 In order to be eligible
for the mitigation benefits of a compliance program, the guidelines
state minimum factors that demonstrate a commitment to
environmental compliance. 98 The factors listed in the guidelines are
(1) attention to compliance from those involved in daily management
of operations; (2) integration of environmental policies, standards,
and procedures; (3) auditing, monitoring, reporting, and tracking to
ensure environmental compliance; (4) regulatory expertise, training,
and evaluation; (5) incentives for compliance; (6) disciplinary
procedures to correct non-compliance; (7) continuing evaluation of
compliance systems to encourage improvement; and (8) additional
innovative approaches to compliance. 99
Thus, the proposed
92. Dinkins & Lonnquist, supranote 78.
93. Memorandum from Phyliss J. Newton, Staff Director, U.S. Sentencing
Commission, Advisory Working Group on Environmental Offenses, Draft Proposal
for Sanctions for Organizations Convicted of Environmental Offenses (Dec. 6,
1993), availableat http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/ENVIRON.pdf.
94. Id. § 9C1.1(f).
95. Id.
96. Id. § 9C1.1(f, cmt. 1.

97. Id § 9C1.2.
98. Id. § 9D11.1
99. Id. § 9D1.1(a).
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guidelines follow upon the corporate sentencing guidelines and state
a clear preference for rigorous environmental management systems
that promote CSR.
The implementation of an effective environmental management
system is also encouraged by the Department of Justice Environment
and Natural Resources Division's ("ENRD") current guidelines for
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 00 In a 1991 guidance memo,
the ENRD stated that its established policy is to "encourage selfauditing, self-policing and voluntary disclosure of environmental
violations by the regulated community."' 0 ' Consequently, it is
ENRD's policy to view such efforts as mitigating factors in deciding
According to ENRD's
whether to bring criminal charges.102
that prosecutors are to
factors
mitigating
guidelines, the three main
consider are timely voluntary disclosure, cooperation of the
organization with government investigators, and the existence of
preventative measures and compliance programs. 0 3 In evaluating an
organization's compliance program, the prosecutor is directed to look
for a "strong institutional policy to comply with all environmental
requirements" and safeguards that go beyond those that are required
by the law.' 0 4
In a guidance memorandum applicable to the entire Department of
Justice, the above principles were reaffirmed and expanded upon in
the context of corporate prosecutions in a 2003 guidance memo by
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson. 0 5 The Thompson memo
instructs prosecutors, in making their charging decisions, to carefully
scrutinize the cooperation of corporations. The memo cautions that
corporations may appear to cooperate, but conduct internal activities
that actually frustrate the purposes of the investigation.106 As with
the 1991 ENRD guidance memo, the Thompson memo lists both

100. See Department of Justice, Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions
for Environmental Violation in the Context of Significant Voluntary Compliance or
1,
1991),
(July
Violator
the
by
Efforts
Disclosure
http://www.justice.gov/enrd/Factorsindecisions.html.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson to United States Attorneys (Jan. 20,
2003), availableat http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm.
106. Id.
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existence and adequacy of a corporate compliance program and
timely and voluntary disclosure of violations as factors that can
mitigate potential charges. 10 7 Therefore, current guidance on the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion further encourages environmental
CSR and the development of programs that go beyond compliance.

IV. CITIZEN SUITS
To the extent that actual or threatened environmental litigation
shapes corporate behavior, citizen suits play a significant role.
Reportedly, seventy-five percent of all civil environmental decisions
issued between 1973 and 2002 were in citizen suits. os Consequently,
citizen suits have played a central role in shaping environmental
jurisprudence. 109 In the context of corporate stewardship of the
environment, citizen suits can be significant for at least two reasons.
First, citizen suits provide an additional means for enforcement of
environmental statutes and regulations, and as discussed above,
increased enforcement activity tends to drive environmental C SR.110
Second, settlements in citizen suit cases can, and often do, produce
outcomes that require the defendant to go beyond compliance."'
This section describes the basics of environmental citizen suits,
provides examples of their use, and evaluates how they may
encourage environmental CSR.
Nearly all of the major environmental laws in the United States
112
In general, citizen suit provisions
have citizen suit provisions.
permit private citizens to enforce the rights of the public under
environmental laws by allowing citizens to play the role of "public
attorneys general."' 13 Congress enacted citizen suit provisions
107. Id.
108. James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen
Suits at 30, 10 WIDENER L. REv. 1, 8 (2003).
109. Id.
110. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
111. See infra notes 122-143 and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (2010);
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2010); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365 (2010); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (2009); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604
(2009); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2009).
113. Andrew J. Currie, The Use of Environmentally Beneficial Expenditures in
Lieu of Penalties as Settlement of Lawsuits: A "Win-Win" Solution? 1996 DET.
C.L. REv. 653, 654.
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beginning with the Clean Air Act in 1970, in part, due to a frustration
with the lack of enforcement of a spate of new environmental laws. "14
In essence, the idea of a citizen suit is that private citizens may
supplement agency enforcement where agency resources are too
limited to prosecute all violators of environmental laws.11 5
Two primary types of citizen suits are used by the public to enforce
environmental laws. In the first type of citizen suit, citizen plaintiffs
may sue the Administrator of the EPA for failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty under the statute.116 In the second type of citizen
suit, citizens may sue anyone who violates the relevant statutes. 117
Although suits against the Administrator may ultimately lead to
more rigorous regulatory schemes, they are unlikely to directly
encourage corporations to go beyond compliance. Therefore, the
second type of citizen suit tends to be more significant in directly
encouraging corporate environmental CSR.
When a citizen plaintiff prevails in an environmental lawsuit, it
may be awarded injunctive relief to halt the statutory violations and
civil penalties that go into the U.S. Treasury."
While citizen suit
plaintiffs are not entitled to damages awards, they often receive
financial payments from liable defendants because prevailing

114. Id. at 661; Frank B. Cross, Rethinking Environmental Citizen Suits, 8
TEMPLE ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 55, 56 (1989).
115. Currie, supranote 113, at 655.
116. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) ("[A]ny citizen may commence a civil
action on his own behalf . .. against the Administrator where there is alleged a
failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter which is
not discretionary with the Administrator."); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) ("[A]ny person
may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . . against the Administrator
where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty
under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator . . . .").
117. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) ("[A]ny citizen may commence a civil
action on his own behalf . . . against any person . . . who is alleged to be in

violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an order
issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or limitation .
. . ."); 42 U.S.C. § 7404(a)(1) ("[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his
own behalf. . . against any person . .. who is alleged to have violated . . . or to be

in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation under this chapter or (B) an
order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or
limitation . .

.

118. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2010).
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plaintiffs are permitted to recover their attorney's fees." 9 Further,
civil penalties paid to the Treasury may be reduced if the defendant
agrees to fund supplemental environmental projects that improve
environmental quality in or near the affected area.120
Historically, the majority of citizen suits have been filed under the
Clean Water Act because the law's structure provides relatively
straightforward cases for public interest groups pursuing
environmental enforcement.
This is because the reporting
requirements of the Clean Water Act provide clear records of permit
violations and the Act's citizen suit provision makes it easy to
prosecute permit exceedance cases.121 In recent years, citizen
enforcement action has increased under the Clean Air Act, as shown
by two recent examples-the cases of Murphy Oil and Shell Deer
Park. Both cases illustrate ways that citizen suits can drive
environmental CSR.
In Concerned Citizens Around Murphy v. Murphy Oil USA, a local

citizens group brought suit against Murphy Oil for alleged violations
of Clean Air Act standards at its Louisiana refinery.' 2 2 The plaintiffs
alleged that Murphy Oil violated applicable emission limits and
impaired their health and quality of life.123 As with many citizen
suits, the plaintiffs' evidence of Murphy's violations of its Clean Air
Act permits consisted of Murphy's own reports to the Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality. 124 As a result, Murphy
conceded some of the alleged violations. On February 4, 2010, the
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana granted partial
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on liability grounds for
both the violations conceded by Murphy and a few of the contested

violations.125
119. See 15 U.S.C. §2619(a)(2) (2010); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2010); 42 U.S.C. §
6972(e) (2009); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2009).
120. Mark Seidenfield & Janna Satz Nugent, "The Friendship of the People":
Citizen Participationin Environmental Enforcement, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 269,
278 (2005).
121. Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and
EnvironmentalProtection, 12 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39, 45 (2003).
122. Concerned Citizens Around Murphy v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 084986, 2010 WL 487405 (E.D. La. Feb. 4, 2010).
123. Id. at*1.
124. Id. at *14-15.
125. Id. at *17-18.
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On September 28, 2010, the United States, through EPA and DOJ,
and the states of Louisiana and Wisconsin announced that they had
agreed to a consent decree with Murphy to settle their claims against
Murphy for alleged violations of various Clean Air Act provisions at
its Wisconsin and Louisiana refineries.126 In consideration for the
injunctive relief and supplemental environmental projects required
under the consent decree, Concerned Citizens Around Murphy agreed
to dismiss its remaining claims pending against Murphy in its citizen
suit. 127 If the proposed consent decree is entered, Murphy Oil will be
required to install emission reduction technologies to reduce nitrogen
oxide emissions and incorporate lower operating limits into its
permits.128 The consent decree will also require Murphy Oil to
comply with more stringent particulate matter and carbon monoxide
limitations. 129 Murphy Oil will also agree to undertake a $1.5 million
supplemental environmental project to reduce emissions of volatile
organic compounds from its Louisiana refinery. 130 In addition, the
consent decree will require Murphy Oil to construct a community air
monitoring station near its Louisiana refinery.131
Furthermore,
Murphy Oil will consent to the inclusion of more stringent standards
for new facilities that may be constructed at its Louisiana refinery in
the future, including onsite coking facilities, in subsequent permits
issued by the State of Louisiana.' 32 These consent decree provisions,
going far beyond the minimal requirements of the Clean Air Act, are
important examples of how citizen suits can drive environmental
CSR.
In January 2008, the Sierra Club and Environment Texas filed a
lawsuit against Shell Oil for violations of the Clean Air Act at its
126. Press Release, Environmental Protection Agency, Murphy Oil USA to Pay
$1.25 Million Penalty to Resolve Clean Air Act Violations / Company to spend
additional $142 million in pollution controls at refineries in Louisiana and
Wisconsin
(September
28,
2010),
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/e77fdd4f5afd88a3852576b3005a604f77
3b49028e6a990a852577ac0056880a!OpenDocument.
127. Proposed Consent Decree at 3-4, United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,
No. 3:10-CV-00563-BBC (W.D. Wisc. Sept. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/decrees/civil/caa/murphyoil-cd.pdf
128. Id. at 14.
129. Id. at 21-24.
130. Id. at 92.

131. Id. at 97.
132. Id. at 94-96.
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Deer Park facility in Houston.133 The suit alleged that Shell Deer
Park committed more than one thousand violations of the Clean Air
Plaintiffs
Act during flaring and upset emission events. 134
allegations arose from emission events that Shell Deer Pak selfreported to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality.' 35 On
June 16, 2009, the District Court approved a consent decree between
the parties.136 Under the consent decree, Shell agreed to make
improvements at the refinery that were designed to minimize
emission events and agreed on enforceable emissions limits for upset
events. 137 Shell also agreed to pay $5.8 million to fund three
environmentally beneficial projects. 138 The majority of this funding
was used to purchase a new fleet of low-emission school buses to
serve the local community.1 39
As in the cases described above, citizen suit settlement agreements
often require the defendant to make contributions to the plaintiff
group, other environmental groups, or to pursue supplemental
environmental projects. 140 Supplemental environmental projects can
involve any range of activities aimed at improving environmental
quality. Because they arise in the context of settlement, supplemental
environmental projects can take on nearly any form that is agreeable
to the parties, subject only to government objection and court
approval.141 Supplemental environmental projects are attractive to
corporations for two reasons. First, unlike civil penalties paid to the
Treasury, contributions made pursuant to settlement agreements may
133. Cindy George, Shell Sued Over Deer Park Refinery Emissions, HousTON
CHRON.,

Jan.

8,

2008,

available

at

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/5433848.html.
134. Jad Mouawad, Shell Settles Air Pollution Actions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/24/business/energyat
available
2009,
environment/24shell.html.
135. George, supra note 133.
136. See Env't Tex. Citizen Lobby, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., Case No. 4:08-CV00070 (S.D. Tex. June 16, 2008) (Docket Entry No. 33) (on file with authors).
137. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER, FACT SHEET: PROPOSED
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN ENVIRONMENT TEXAS, SIERRA CLUB, AND

SHELL

OIL

COMPANY

1,

available

http://www.nelconline.org/shell fact sheet.doc.
138. Mouwad, supra note 134.
139. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER, supranote 137, at 2.

140. Currie, supra note 113, at 663-64.
141. Id.

at
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be tax deductible. 142
Second, investment in environmentally
beneficial projects unrelated to the violation may provide the
corporation with a mechanism to rehabilitate its image.143
Citizen suits, therefore, play an important role in shaping corporate
environmental behavior. First, by providing increased enforcement
activity, they encourage both compliance and over-compliance with
the law.
Second, citizen-suit settlements may require the
development of new corporate environmental programs and
investment in supplemental environmental projects.
V. OTHER PRIVATE PARTY LITIGATION
In addition to classic citizen suits enforcing violations of permit
conditions, other forms of private party litigation also may shape
corporate environmental behavior. This section examines two types
of private party litigation that tend to encourage environmental CSR:
permitting actions and tort law claims. While many tort law claims
are more focused on recovering damages, some claims reflect
evolving societal expectations about acceptable behavior. Similarly,
the recent rise in permit issuance challenges reflects a new attitude
about the acceptability of certain types of pollution.
A. Permit Challenges

Three recent cases involving challenges to permits or other similar
authorizations include the challenges to Conoco Phillips Wood River
Refinery's PSD permit, the air permit renewal of the LyondellBassell
facility in Houston, and the challenge of local approvals for new WalMart stores in Perris and Yucca Valley, California. These cases
demonstrate that societal expectations about socially acceptable
environmental behavior may evolve and exceed what is minimally
required by environmental regulations.
These cases, however,
demonstrate that the impact of such permit challenges on
environmental CSR will depend upon the corporation's assessment of
its ability to survive the challenge and obtain the requested permit in
an expedient fashion and the actions the corporation has proactively
taken to reduce its environmental impact.

142. Seidenfield & Nugent, supranote 120, at 278.
143. Id.
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1. Conoco Phillips Wood River Refinery
Conoco Phillips owns and operates the Wood River Refinery in
Illinois. To support its growing tar sands operations in Canada,
Conoco Phillips sought a permit to expand the Wood River
Refinery.144 In order to undertake the expansion, Conoco Phillips
required a prevention of significant deterioration ("PSD") permit
under the Clean Air Act. Concerned about the environmental
impacts of the proposed expansion, the Sierra Club, the American
Bottoms Conservancy, the Environmental Integrity Project, and the
Natural Resources Defense Council all opposed the issuance of the
permit. The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency ("IEPA")
issued the permit on July 19, 2007, and the American Bottoms
Conservancy and Sierra Club then filed a challenge to the permit with
the United States EPA's Environmental Appeals Board. 145
On June 2, 2008, the Environmental Appeals Board remanded the
permit to the IEPA for further consideration of issues related to the
control of carbon monoxide and the need for emissions controls for
flaring activities. 146 Under a September 2008 settlement agreement,
Conoco Phillips agreed to adopt numeric limitations for emissions
from flares. The most significant aspect of these limitations is that
they will be applicable even during maintenance, startup, and
shutdown activities, which historically have been exempted from
permitting requirements. When faced with the prospect of additional
delays due to permit reconsideration, Conoco Phillips opted for a
greater level of environmental protection than what was required by
the law.
2. Wal-Mart Stores in Perris and Yucca Valley, California
Similarly, Wal-Mart recently entered into an agreement settling
challenges to local approvals authorizing it to construct two new
"Supercenters" in Perris and Yucca Valley, California. 147 The
Center for Biological Diversity and other environmental groups
144. ConocoPhillips Co., 13 E.A.D. 768, 769 (2008).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See Tiffany Hsu, Wal-Mart Settles Two Environmental Lawsuits Over
Planned Perris and Yucca Valley Stores, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 8, 2010, available at
http://latimesblogs.1atimes.com/money co/2010/03/walmart-settles-twoenvironmental-lawsuits-over-planned-perris-and-yucca-valley-stores.html.
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challenged the local approvals of the two proposed Wal-Mart stores
under the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA").14 8
CEQA requires local governments to prepare an environmental
impact report for any project that they approve that "may have a
significant effect on the environment."l 49 The plaintiffs alleged that
the environmental reviews conducted by the local government
agencies that approved the construction of the proposed Perris and
Yucca Valley stores failed to adequately assess the climate change
impact of the proposed stores and failed to consider potential
measures that could reduce the greenhouse gas emissions associated
with the new stores. 150
To settle these challenges, Wal-Mart agreed, among other things,
to install three roof-top solar facilities of at least 250 kilowatts at
locations in California, incorporate certain high efficiency measures
into the design of the Yucca Valley and Perris stores, implement an
"enhanced refrigeration audit and improvement program to maximize
efficiencies related to the use of refrigerants at existing Wal-Mart
stores in California," and make a $120,000 contribution to the
Mojave Desert Land Trust.15'
Wal-Mart, like Conoco Phillips,
decided it would prefer to implement non-mandatory measures to
mitigate the potential environmental impact of its new stores rather
than continue to litigate challenges to required government approvals.

148. Press Release, Center for Biological Diversity, Settlement Reached to
Reduce Global Warming Impacts of Walmart Supercenters in Southern California
(March
8,
2010),
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press-releases/2010/walmart-03-082010.html.
149. CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 21151(a) (West 2009).
150. Press Release, supra note 148; Press Release, California Court Blocks WalMart Supercenter: Wal-Mart Violated California Law by Ignoring Climate Change
(May 14, 2009), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/pressreleases/2009/walmart-05-14-2009.html.
151. See Letter from Matthew Vespa, Authorized Representative, Center for
Biological Diversity, et al., to Hon. Mayor Chad Mayes and Town Council, Town
of
Yucca
Valley
(March
4,
2010),
available
at
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/ceqa/pdfs/walmart-settlement-letteryucca-valley.pdf (disclosing major terms of settlement); Letter from Matthew
Vespa, Authorized Representative, Center for Biological Diversity, et al., to Hon.
Daryl Busch and City Councilmembers, City of Perris (March 4, 2010), available
at
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/ceqa/pdfs/walmart-settlementletter-perris.pdf (disclosing major terms of settlement).
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Notably, many of the measures in the settlement agreement apply to
Wal-Mart's larger operations in California, not just to the proposed
stores at issue in the permit challenges.
3. LyondellBasell Refinery in Houston, Texas
In contrast, the permitting challenge to the LyondellBasell facility
in Houston is an example of a case where the challenge does not
appear to have altered corporate behavior because it did not affect the
issuance of the required permit. LynodellBasell operates a large
refinery located along the Houston Ship Channel, and is reportedly
one of the largest benzene emitters in the country. 5 2 In 2008, the
plant applied for a renewal of its ten year operating permit under the

Clean Air Act. 153
LyondellBasell's application for renewal emphasized that not only
was the company in compliance with its permit but also that it
154
planned to significantly reduce future benzene emissions.
Nevertheless, asserting a concern about the potential health impacts
of proposed levels of benzene emissions, the City of Houston
petitioned the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality
15 5 On
("TCEQ") to hold a hearing on the permit before granting it.
February 24, 2010, TCEQ denied the City's request for a hearing,
finding that it was not permitted to grant a hearing when the permit
application was not seeking to increase allowable emissions. 156 The
LyondellBassell example thus demonstrates that, due to constraints in
state permitting processes, not all permit challenges will directly
result in environmental CSR initiatives.
B. Tort Litigation

Tort suits are perhaps the most important indicator of evolving
societal expectations with respect to environmental performance.
Because tort claims are grounded in the common law, they can
evolve at the same pace as public expectations. Unlike statutory or
152. Matthew Tresaugue, State to Reject Hearing on Air Permit at
LyondellBassell Refinery, HoUSTON CHRON., Feb, 24, 2010, available at
6 882
100.html.
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/hotstories/
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.

152

FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXI

regulatory limitations, which should be static until amended by the
relevant authority, common law adapts with the expectations of
society. That is, if plaintiffs are able to convince juries and courts
that conduct is socially unacceptable and demand compensation, tort
suits will regulate environmental conduct that is not addressed in
statutory law. Even in areas where there is an environmental
statutory scheme, common law tort claims may still be permitted if
they address harms not covered by the statute.' 57
One significant area of tort litigation reflecting changing public
expectations is the rise of common law claims for climate change
damages.
While these cases have yet to proceed to the merits, they
have attempted to establish that common law tort plaintiffs have
standing to bring claims for climate change harms.1 59
The significant climate change tort cases that have been litigated to
date have reached different conclusions with respect to plaintiffs
standing. The Northern District of California has twice held that
plaintiffs standing is precluded by the political question doctrine.1 60
The Southern District of Mississippi also concluded that common law
climate change plaintiffs lacked standing on the grounds that their
claims presented a political question. 161 While this holding was
initially overturned by a 5th Circuit panel, a procedural issue in the
granted en banc rehearing resulted in the panel decision being
vacated, leaving the District Court's dismissal as the final decision in
the case. 163 In contrast, the Second Circuit has held that plaintiffs
have standing to bring climate change tort claims.1 64
157. Typically, environmental statutes will be found to preempt a broad range of
common law claims, and may in fact lead to field preemption. See Milwaukee v.
Ill., 451 U.S. 304 (1981). However, most statutes have express savings clauses that
preserve the rights of parties to bring common law claims for matters not covered
by the regulatory scheme. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(e) (2009).
158. See, e.g., Comer v. Murphy Oil Co., 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009); Conn. v.
Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009); Native Village of Kivalina v.
ExxonMobil, 633 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
159. See cases cited supra note 158.
160. Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 883 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Cal. v.
General Motors, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *58 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
161. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 2007 WL 6942285 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 30,
2007).
162. Comer, 585 F.3d 855, at 860.
163. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010).
164. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d 309, at 315.
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Although the determination that a plaintiff has standing requires a
much lower showing of causality than that required to establish tort
causation,165 gaining initial recognition of standing for climate
change plaintiffs is still significant because it means that these
plaintiffs have persuaded judges that they may have suffered injuries
due to global warming that are "fairly traceable to" the emissions of
defendants.1 66 Even if the harms for climate change damages are
subject to divisibility analysis, the scale of projected harms is so large
that a verdict in favor of a climate change plaintiff could give rise to
significant financial liability.167 Therefore, because of the potential
for substantial liability, the fact that several climate change tort
claims have survived standing challenges may spur corporations to
proactively reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
Furthermore, in addition to their potential to impose substantial
liability on the defendants, these cases often involve sympathetic
plaintiffs, and therefore are likely to capture public attention. For
example, in Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, the plaintiff is
The Village claims the defendant
an Inupiat Eskimo Village.'
energy and power companies' greenhouse gas emissions caused the
melting of sea ice in front of the Village.1 69 According to the
plaintiffs, this sea ice formed a protective barrier, and without it,
summer storms have dramatically increased coastal erosion and
rendered the town uninhabitable.' 70 Plaintiffs consequently seek
damages to cover the costs of relocating the town.17 1 Similarly, the
plaintiffs in Comer v. Murphy Oil Co. are victims of Hurricane
Katrina who allege that defendant's emissions increased the severity
of the storm, and thereby contributed to the storm damage they
Accordingly, these cases have the potential to
sustained.172
significantly alter public perception of the defendant companies and

165. See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
166. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
167. For an explanation of the application of divisibility to climate change tort
claims see Kevin A. Gaynor, Benjamin S. Lippard, & Margaret E. Peloso,
Challenges Plaintiffs Face in Litigating Federal Common-Law Climate Change
Claims, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10845, 10854-56 (2010).
168. Kivalina v. ExxonMobil, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
169. Id. at 869.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Comer v. Murphy Oil Co., 585 F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009).
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on the issue of global climate change in general, which could result in
further pressure being exerted on industry to voluntarily reduce
greenhouse gas emissions.' 7 3
These examples illustrate how two types of private litigationpermit challenges and common law tort litigation-may serve as
drivers of environmental CSR. These cases, however, are distinct
from statutory enforcement by the government and citizens discussed
in sections II to IV. Unlike statutory enforcement cases, which have
a direct deterrent effect due to the potential for similar prosecutions
and certain penalties in the future, the cases discussed in this section
mainly subject corporations to delays in project development,
litigation expenses, and potentially unwanted publicity. Indeed, these
latter cases are likely as important for their outcomes in the court of
public opinion. Consequently, how much these cases will affect the
behavior of a given corporation will depend upon its tolerance for
litigation and project delays and the value that it places upon its
environmental reputation.
VI. CONCLUSION
As corporations learned from CERCLA litigation, sometimes

compliance with the law in the present may not suffice to prevent
substantial liability in the future. Therefore, corporations have an
incentive to look ahead and plan for the long term by proactively
identifying ways to decrease their impact on the environment, even if
not required to do so by any applicable law or regulation.
173. It should be noted that, in addition to the tort uncertainly associated with
climate change tort litigation, large greenhouse gas emitters are also faced with
regulatory uncertainty due to the EPA's plans to regulate greenhouse gases under
the Clean Air Act. EPA recently issued a finding that greenhouse gases endanger
human health and welfare, which is the first step to regulation under the Clean Air
Act. 74 Fed. Reg. 66, 496 (Dec. 15, 2009). The EPA has also announced a vehicle
GHG rule and a "tailoring rule" to apply the Clean Air Act's PSD provisions to
major emitters of greenhouse gases. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324
(May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, & 600); Prevention of
Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule 75 Fed. Reg.
31514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, & 71) This dual
potential for regulation and common law tort litigation will likely lead some
business entities to take proactive steps to minimize their greenhouse gas
emissions.
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Criminal liability under most of the major environmental statutes
can be premised upon as little as a single knowing violation of an
emission limit set in a permit. Therefore, given the possibility that
emissions will be variable, even corporations that are in compliance
most of the time may still be exposed to criminal enforcement
litigation for occasional permit violations.
Given these low
thresholds, corporations that wish to avoid environmental prosecution
will have incentives to go beyond the bare minimum that is required
for compliance. Furthermore, the federal Sentencing Guidelines and
DOJ guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion offer the
potential of greater leniency for companies that proactively manage
environmental issues and go beyond minimal compliance.
Accordingly, concerns over the threat of criminal enforcement
litigation can be a major driver of environmental CSR.
Citizen suits and other types of environmental civil litigation can
similarly result in substantial liability, delay, and/or litigation
expenses. Therefore, they too encourage companies to proactively
seek to avoid the grey area and do more than the minimum required
to avoid the direct consequences of litigation.
Moreover, environmental litigation can have more indirect
consequences that may also drive environmental CSR. For example,
environmental lawsuits can be damaging to brand image and impact
the overall value of a corporation. Corporate stock prices may also
be negatively affected by the mere announcement of a major law suit.
In addition, corporations that are subject to criminal environmental
prosecutions may face a number of undesirable collateral
consequences, including social stigma and the inability to be awarded
government contracts.174 When combined with the relatively strict
thresholds that can trigger environmental liability, these non-legal
factors provide important incentives to avoid environmental
litigation.
Because much environmental CSR is likely driven by concerns
over brand value and public image, the most important benchmarks
are likely to be those set by public expectations and policies that
guide decisions about enforcement and sentencing. These factors
allow corporations to conform to societal expectations in an attempt
to avoid both statutory and common law liability for environmental
harms. Given the significant financial and reputation damage that
174. See Dinkins, supra note 42, at 318.
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corporations may sustain in environmental litigation, it appears likely
that litigation will continue to be a significant driver of CSR in the
future.

